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legal history literature," specifically, the writings of John Phillip 
Reid, Barbara Black, and Thomas C. Grey, who, according to 
Greene, have established that custom in eighteenth century British 
constitutional thinking was good law and that, therefore, the cus-
tomary arrangements in the American colonies, including legisla-
tive independence of the British Parliament, was as "correct" an 
understanding of the constitution as the "modem" doctrine of par-
liamentary sovereignty. To assume that theories such as sover-
eignty are correct because they are articulated by the center is, in 
Greene's view, a common historical fallacy. 
In my opinion Greene (and Reid before him) overemphasizes 
the importance of custom, obscuring an important dimension in the 
legal climate of revolutionary America. In making the British con-
stitution and custom the sources of American rights, Reid and 
Greene ignore natural law, to which Reid is intemperately hostile. 
The First Continental Congress (1774) and a host of revolutionary 
writers, including James Madison, considered natural law a princi-
pal source of American rights. To neglect natural law is to distort 
the constitutional and political history of their period. 
Despite this shortcoming, the book is an excellent his-
torigraphical essay on the recent literature on the conflicting inter-
pretations of the constitution of the First British Empire and the 
consequences of these different views. As such, it is an extremely 
valuable synthesis that can be recommended to anyone who wishes 
to read a compact, judicious, comprehensive survey of the last 
twenty years' scholarship on a complex subject which has attracted 
a vigorous amount of scholarship, even in an era in which social 
history holds sway. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. By 
Robert F. Nagel.t Berkeley: University of California Press. 
1989. Pp. xii, 232. Cloth, $29.95. 
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Of one thing I am perfectly clear: that it is not by deciding the suit, but by compro-
mising the difference, that peace can be restored or kept. They who would put an 
end to such quarrels by declaring roundly in favor of the whole demands of either 
I. Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. 
2. Dean and Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. 
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party have mistaken, ... the office of a mediator. 3 
In this volume of elegant and thematically related essays Pro-
fessor Robert Nagel advances a critique of contemporary American 
judicial review that is one part Edmund Burke, one part Michael 
Oakeshott and one part James Bradley Thayer. These echoes of, 
respectively, the seminal figure of Anglo-American conservatism, 
the foremost modern critic of the spirit of overweening rationalism 
in politics, and the first of the great academic proponents of judicial 
restraint, ought not obscure the author's impressive originality and 
boldness in formulating a nearly unique stance from which to ap-
praise the Supreme Court's performance over the past three or four 
decades. 
Although written by an academic lawyer, this book is likely to 
puzzle many lawyer-readers. Nagel's analysis is quite unlike any-
thing else written about American constitutionalism for a very long 
time. Professor Nagel is, to say the least, highly skeptical concern-
ing the supposed benefits and contributions of judicial activism. In 
contrast to so many other constitutional law scholars, such as 
Michael Perry, Thomas Grey, John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper, he 
does not offer elaborate edifices of justification for judicial activism 
in constitutional cases. Yet Nagel is not a typical conservative juris-
prudent of the school exemplified by Robert Bork, insistent that 
constitutional interpretation confine itself to modest elaborations of 
the ratifiers' intentions or understandings. Almost uniquely among 
modern constitutional jurisprudents, Nagel is not preoccupied with 
the lawfulness or "legitimacy" of one or another doctrinal expan-
sion, contraction or methodology. It would not be unwarranted to 
describe Nagel's vantage point as being akin to that of the cultural 
anthropologist, as indeed this volume's title is perhaps meant to 
suggest, albeit one with an appealingly literary sensibility. His 
achievement of such an enlarged perspective constitutes a remarka-
ble intellectual tour de force on the part of one whose scholarly vo-
cation is to work in a specialty at once as sterile and as distracted as 
academic constitutional law has lately become. It is all the more 
estimable in that Nagel deploys the insights with which these essays 
are studded with such commendable grace and evocativeness of 
style, unmarred by any trace of the clanking laboriousness of the 
typical academic, legal, and interdisciplinary styles. 
It is hardly surprising that relatively few of Nagel's colleagues 
in constitutional law appear, judging from the paucity of reviews, to 
3. Letters to the Sheriffs of Bristol, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDMUND BURKE 212-
13 (W. J. Bate ed. 1960). 
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have known just what to make of this work, or else seem to have 
been caught fiat-footed by it.4 Nagel's central, unifying thesis is 
stated in his opening paragraph: 
The meaning of the Constitution of the United States, of course, emerges from the 
advenarial argument and judicial opinions that make up the legal culture. It is less 
commonly appreciated that the Constitution is also expressed in the institutions, 
behaviors, and understandings that form the general political culture .... [I] urge 
that judicial interpretations should be viewed not only in the conventional way, as 
efforts to extract meaning from the document, but also as embodiments of the intel-
lectual culture of lawyers and judg~bodiments, that is, of certain analytic and 
communicative styles. I urge, moreover, that for reasons that are intrinsic to adju-
dication, this legal constitution is inferior in important ways to the political consti-
tution and that excessive reliance on judicial review is undermining both fidelity to 
constitutional principles and the general health of the political culture. 
Elaborating in a variety of contexts upon that opening salvo, 
Nagel proceeds in the rest of the volume to flesh out his contention 
that, not only has judicial review often ill-served the constitutional 
values it is supposed to preserve and strengthen within its own 
proper sphere of operation, the decision of constitutional cases, but 
that it has exerted itself in ways he finds inimical to the continuing 
vitality of what might be called "consensual constitutionalism" as 
manifested in the political branches of government. This depiction 
could not, it hardly needs saying, be more dramatically at odds with 
the conventional wisdom on the subject, especially as eagerly propa-
gated by those legal academics whom Bork refers to as the "clerisy 
of judicial power."s According to the prevalent myth, widely ac-
cepted in the academy, the media, and throughout the self-congrat-
ulatory legal profession itself, it is only by means of vigorous 
judicial activism that the political branches, and by extension the 
American people, have been prevented from sacrificing the nation's 
constitutional heritage on the altar of bigotry, expediency, and gen-
eralized doltishness. This is a conceit, needless to say, enormously 
pleasing to lawyers and judges. Nagel's purpose in these essays is to 
puncture it, as he bluntly states: 
This book suggests that one main enemy of the constitutional order, whether con-
ceived of as a public morality or a political theory, is the routinization of judicial 
power. The judiciary's frequent intervention in ordinary political affairs works 
against both the preservation and the healthy growth of our constitutional tradi-
tions. Excessively concerned about tangible accomplishment, courts close them-
4. Thus, Professor Lupu indignantly rejects Nagel's lines of argument largely on the 
ground they would not have countenanced Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and that in 
tum would have left the "fledgling women's movement" of the day vulnerable to exhaustion 
and backlash in waging the struggle for abortion rights through the political processes. Lupu, 
Book Review, 103 HARV. L. REv. 951, 961 (1990). 
5. R. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 134 (1990). 
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selves off from the wisdom available in the political constitution and undermine 
long-term support for basic principles. I maintain that this is so more than we like 
to admit even in those areas, such as freedom of speech, where judicial power is 
usually thought most appropriate. When controlling behavior is less important 
than shaping attitudes, preoccupation with social control can also lead to judicial 
abdication. This, too, can impoverish public understandings, and I use federalism 
to illustrate this possibility. 
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Nagel's understanding of what is entailed by constitutionalism 
clearly owes much of its inspiration to the manner in which the 
concept has been understood and practiced in Great Britain, and 
considerably less to the individual-rights orientation that has, on 
the model of Marbury v. Madison, largely predominated in this 
country. The British Constitution, of course, consists only in part, 
and that by no means the greater part, of judicially declared doc-
trines concerning individual rights. Rather, it is compounded of a 
vaguely delineated and only partially articulated inheritance of 
traditions, usages, understandings, customs and self-denying ordi-
nances that have evolved over centuries of experience. Its ingredi-
ents and contours have been shaped more by political than by 
judicial actors; by the Crown, the Cabinet, Parliament, and even on 
occasion by the established church, the universities and authorita-
tive commentators, both academic and journalistic. This being so, 
the imperatives and prohibitions somewhat indeterminately im-
posed by the British Constitution have never been remote from pub-
lic opinion and consensus, whether elite as in the past or more 
popular as in recent times. Its vaunted success has been largely 
achieved by the famous Burkean disposition to compromise, to re-
frain from pushing questions to their limits, and by an instinct for 
avoiding precise, hard-and-fast articulations of rules and doctrines 
possessing the status of "the supreme Law of the Land .... "6 
Another important facet of British constitutionalism, at least 
implicitly admired by Nagel, has been its disinclination to vest cen-
tralized and paramount authority in any single institution or body 
to ascertain and declare constitutional meaning in a fashion under-
stood to be final and binding upon the entirety of British govern-
ment and society. How vastly different, and how much worse in 
Nagel's view, is the condition of constitutionalism in the United 
States: 
The legal profession monopolizes the opportunity both to present arguments to 
courts and to render authoritative interpretations. Lawyers therefore affect not 
only what the Constitution is, as a practical matter, but also how it is thought about 
and understood. Our conception of the Constitution has been shaped by their in-
stincts and intellectual habits. 
6. U.S. CONST. art, VI, cl. 2. 
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Just what is it, then, that Nagel finds so deficient in the in-
stincts and intellectual habits of American lawyers and judges that, 
in his view, renders their hegemonic role in our brand of constitu-
tionalism so problematic? The answer he gives is that "[l]egal train-
ing emphasizes argumentative skills . . . [that] require acute 
sensitivity to the potential for intellectual uncertainty." This 
"builds upon and accentuates contemporary tendencies toward rela-
tivism and solipsism." He laments the consequence that "those 
most entrusted with the meaning of our fundamental document are 
by training, role, and instinct inclined to think that it is difficult to 
discover meaning." 
Of course, American lawyers possess an instinct and exercise a 
professional role that go beyond asserting the vagueness and inde-
terminateness of the Constitution; otherwise their vocational mis-
sion would be to invest it with a characteristic of the British 
constitution that is generally regarded, and at least impliedly so re-
garded by Nagel, as one of its shining virtues, namely, its relative 
lack of precision and specificity. Their initial assertion of uncer-
tainty is merely by way of preparing the ground for its resolution by 
judicial determination of meaning, which leads, according to Nagel, 
to "absorption in recondite interpretation." As Burke might phrase 
it, by their incessant involvement in the increasingly routinized pro-
cess of "recondite interpretation," American lawyers and judges 
have "split and atomized the doctrine,"7 not perhaps of free govern-
ment, but of our Constitution. As a consequence of this tendency: 
A document that was originally grounded on the importance of personal industry 
and private property has been interpreted to emphasize self-expression and sexual 
freedom. A document carefully designed to constrain strong national power and to 
protect valued local authority now permits almost limitless national power and re-
gards local authority with suspicion. 
Despite its professional instincts, and what Nagel might call its 
worst efforts, the American judiciary has not yet succeeded in de-
vouring the whole of the Constitution in the maw of its "recondite 
interpretation." Mercifully, according to him, there remain many 
important provisions of the document that have more or less es-
caped the jaundiced gaze of judicial scrutiny and calibration. These 
constitute what Nagel calls "the political constitution," a miscel-
lany of by no means inconsequential provisions whose imprecision 
of meaning might be thought to cry out for judicial parsing, but 
7. "There are people who have split and atomized the doctrine of free government, as 
though it were an abstract question concerning metaphysical liberty and necessity, and not a 
matter of moral prudence and natural feeling."' Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, E. BURKE, 
supra note 3, at 210. 
1991] BOOK REVIEW 201 
which have instead been left almost entirely to officials of the polit-
ical branches to interpret and apply in commonsensical fashion. 
Among these are the guarantee of a "republican form of govern-
ment" to each state, the procedures for amending the Constitution, 
provisions empowering Congress effectively to regulate the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, and the requirement that treaties, but not 
executive agreements, be ratified by the Senate. These, along with 
many other constitutional provisions, comprise a "political consti-
tution" more or less walled off from judicial intrusion by the so-
called political question doctrine. But this doctrinal barrier has be-
come ever more porous with decisions such as Baker v. Carr and 
Powell v. McCormack, and has for some time been under sustained 
attack by leading academic commentators. Nagel argues that, by 
and large, the political constitution has in important ways fared bet-
ter than the "legal Constitution" so voraciously engrossed by the 
judiciary: 
[T]he understandings that emerge from practice are often not fixed or precise. But 
meaning need not be formalized to be real. It remains both true and important that 
effective agreement has consistently existed to the effect that presidents are not re-
moved from office over policy differences, that state governments are organized 
around basic democratic principles, that Congress "assembles" every year, and so 
on. [I]t is true that uninterpreted meaning is usually basic meaning-unsurprising 
and unexceptional. But that the meaning that emerges from practice should seem 
obvious merely underlines the extent to which tacit agreement about such meaning 
is widely shared and firmly established. If constitutional meaning is to be durable, 
it must seem to be plain to those who are governed by it. Perhaps uninterpreted 
meaning is both obvious and relatively stable, not because of the special characteris-
tics of certain provisions, but because of the special capacity of practice to sustain 
effective consensus. 
What in Nagel's account has evolved respecting the dynamic 
balance in this country between the legal and political constitutions, 
and done so with accelerated momentum since Brown v. Board of 
Education, is a "confrontation model [that] ignores the costs of a 
routinely pugnacious judiciary." This routinized judicial pugnacity 
both assumes and reinforces the popular sense that the political 
branches "have no disposition to honor constitutional rights." In-
deed [p]opular disagreement has sometimes become almost a sign of 
proper, even heroic, use of interpretive authority" by courts. 
I am recommending that the idea of judicial restraint be reexamined and reempha-
sized. The essence of restraint is the admission that the Constitution does not apply 
to many public issues or, at least ... not in any determinative way. This acknowl-
edgement conflicts with functions that are understandably difficult for judges to 
yield. It conflicts with the strongly felt duty to assure continuing fidelity to consti-
tutional norms. However . . . an unchecked urge to enforce those norms through 
adjudication may in fact undermine the capacity for durable constitutional 
government. 
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Nagel's point here seems quite similar to a central thrust of 
James Bradley Thayer's classic, though by current standards rather 
quaint, argument for generalized judicial restraint. Thayer's con-
tention was that judges should indulge a strong presumption that 
the political branches have taken their obligation to support the 
Constitution seriously.s Only the strongest showing to the contrary 
should lead to judicial intervention. Nagel obviously agrees with 
this stringent standard: "The judiciary's power to invalidate the de-
cisions of other institutions should be reserved for those special oc-
casions when some aberrant governmental action is emphatically 
inconsistent with constitutional theory, text and public understand-
ing as expressed in prolonged practice." The at first blush surpris-
ing, truck-size opening afforded by Nagel's use of the phrase 
"constitutional theory" is narrowed considerably by the conjunctive 
addition of "text," and nearly slammed shut by the further addition 
of "public understanding" and "prolonged practice." 
Nagel discerns at least two major kinds of harm arising from 
an aggressively confrontational judiciary determined to impose its 
"recondite interpretation" upon the political branches and hence 
the nation at large. The first is that it "weaken[s] the capacity of the 
political culture to develop moral understandings and to initiate 
wise change." By this he appears to mean that the incessant bar-
rage of constitutional invalidations issuing from the judiciary, and 
the intense media attention focused upon much of it, convey an im-
plied but unmistakable message to the American people and per-
haps even to the political branches themselves that the latter are 
somehow seriously and chronically defective, unworthy, perpetually 
inclined toward waywardness, if not outright lawlessness. In other 
words, it imbues the American polity and political decisionmakers 
with a pervasive distrust in themselves and in democratically ac-
countable forms of government. Like Thayer, Nagel believes that 
"lawyers' aggressive instinct for interpretation ought not be permit-
ted to displace the generous understanding that the Constitution be-
longs to all of us," and that it can "be safer with us than is 
commonly believed." 
Nagel's second line of major criticism has to do with the con-
tent of judicially declared constitutional doctrine itself. Much of it 
he finds to be factitious and arcane, intellectually and morally im-
poverished, and volatile, as well as inordinately focused upon trivial 
or marginal concerns. Even in the area of freedom of expression, 
where most people would probably regard vigilant judicial review as 
8. See generally, Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). 
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most needed and most efficacious, Nagel gives the overall perform-
ance of the courts decidedly mixed reviews. He is reasonably confi-
dent, certainly more so than most academics, that neither the 
American people nor their elected representatives are generally in-
clined toward systemic or seriously damaging repression of dissent-
ing views. He points out that when serious threats to free 
expression have actually occurred, as during McCarthy's campaign 
against supposed subversives, it has been the political branches and 
a finally aroused popular opinion that, far more than the courts, 
have supplied the corrective. Nagel naturally does not deny that 
the expressive rights of particular litigants have been vindicated and 
protected in the line of famous first amendment cases. But because 
he views many of these cases as having focused upon such marginal 
issues as the right to display the words "Fuck the Draft" in a court-
room or nude dancing as public entertainment, Nagel speculates 
that, while those decisions did protect the particular forms of ex-
pression engaged in by the particular defendants involved, they may 
have had a negative effect on the public's general attitude toward 
and tolerance of more delicate and important kinds of utterance. 
Echoing Learned Hand's famous address on "The Spirit of Lib-
erty,"9 Nagel believes that, over time and particularly during peri-
ods of societal stress or severe polarization, freedom of expression 
and the values it serves are far more importantly safeguarded by 
widespread, intuitive popular tolerance than by some number of ju-
dicial decisions lavishing undue attention and respect upon bizarre 
or trivial instances of marginally expressive conduct, like Cohen's 
"Fuck the Draft" jacket, worn in a courthouse. His critics, of 
course, would respond that the core of popular tolerance is in fact 
protected by decisions, such as Cohen v. California, at the outer bat-
tlements of freedom, where, as a practical matter, the impulse to 
suppress is most likely to begin its encroachments. 
Although this brief summary may convey the impression that 
Nagel devalues individual rights or thinks that courts ought not to 
protect them, that is certainly not the case. The texture and struc-
ture of his argumentation are so delicate and nuanced that any ef-
fort to recapitulate it risks caricaturing Nagel and falsely depicting 
him as an unalloyed majoritarian, even authoritarian. In addition 
to his approval of Brown, he finds a good deal to commend in the 
judiciary's protections of individual rights and liberties, and leaves 
9. "I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, 
upon laws and upon courts . . . . Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies 
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it . . . . While it lies there it needs no 
constitution, no law, no COUrt to save it." L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (3rd ed. 
1960). 
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no doubt that he regards this role as indispensable. His principal 
criticism is that our courts have been so preoccupied with adjudi-
cating issues involving the rights of individuals that they have ne-
glected, almost to the point of abdication, such structural values 
and principles of the Constitution as federalism and separation of 
powers: 
The harsh reaction to Usery [the 1976 decision that invalidated application of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state governments, overruled by 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority just eight years later] is one 
aspect of a widespread pattern that inverts the priorities of the framers: an obses-
sive concern for using the Constitution to protect individuals' rights. This fascina-
tion with rights reinforces a form of instrumentalism that is too confining to be an 
adequate way to think about constitutional law. 
By "instrumentalism," sometimes referred to as "naive" or 
"crude instrumentalist assumptions," Nagel has in mind "the im-
plicit notion ... that the purpose of constitutional doctrine is to 
shape the world in certain and measurable ways." There could 
hardly be a more perfect illustration of this proclivity than last 
term's decision declaring political patronage unconstitutional, 10 
which, as Justice Scalia said in dissent, effectively imposed a civil 
service regime upon the nation. To Nagel's way of thinking, to as-
sociate judicial review so nearly exclusively with individual rights is 
"to trivialize the Constitution." (A facetious subtitle for this vol-
ume that has suggested itself to this reviewer is "Trivial Pursuits," 
understood as applying to the judicial performance it criticizes and 
not to the book itself.) Moreover, it denigrates the fact that "[t]he 
framers' political theory was immediately concerned with organiza-
tions, not individuals .... [and that] Their most important contribu-
tions had to do with power allocations-with the blending and 
separation of power among the branches of government and with 
the bold effort to create a strong national government while main-
taining strong state governments." Because the values implicated in 
Usery were "merely" structural and symbolic, its doctrine was not 
apt for the instrumentalist purpose of shaping or reshaping Ameri-
can society, and thus the decision was curtly dismissed as lacking in 
precisely delimitable, cutting-edge substance by nearly all scholarly 
commentators and was shortly and unceremoniously jettisoned by 
the Supreme Court itself. 
To observe that Nagel's collection of provocative essays swims 
against the prevailing tide in contemporary American constitutional 
law would be the grossest of understatements. The unreflective as-
sumption that the Constitution is predominantly a cornucopia of 
10. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990). 
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individual rights and that the preeminent role of the judiciary is to 
protect them has become so profoundly entrenched and ingrained 
that it is doubtful whether so evocative and subtle a thesis as 
Nagel's can make much headway against it. As Jeremy Rabkin has 
recently argued in his equally heterodox Judicial Compulsions, even 
at the "subconstitutional" level of public policymaking by adminis-
trative agencies, an incessantly burgeoning rights orientation has in-
creasingly judicialized and legalized that sphere of governmental 
activity with little or no apparent resistance from the political 
branches. 
Nagel's theory of judicial conservatism is, as I have noted, 
Burkean, not Borkean. American conservatives have, for some 
time, been, to say the least, unhappy and dissatisfied with the man-
ner in which judicial review has lately been conducted. Apart from 
a few libertarian proponents of judicial activism on behalf of prop-
erty rights, conservatives' principal line of attack has formed 
around one or another variant of originalism or interpretivism as 
epitomized by Bork. The strength of that approach, such as it may 
be, is also, from the distinctive perspective of conservativism, a 
weakness. Its strength, and whatever political appeal it might pos-
sess, inhere in its anti-elitism, its antipathy toward rule by unelected 
judges, it majoritarianism; in short, its capacity for arousing essen-
tially populist sensibilities and resentments. 
The nagging flaw of originalism, again from a specifically con-
servative point of view, is that majoritarianism and populism ill 
consort with the foundational lineaments of historic conservatism. 
It is this discordance that should have made some conservatives, 
however strongly they supported him, just a bit uneasy about much 
of the thrust of Bork's testimony as Supreme Court nominee. After 
all, since when have conservatives, of all people, so lustily idealized 
and exalted the vox populi, or even electoral majorities "told by the 
head," II as though they were the summum bonum, or the ultimate 
arbiters of the well-ordered commonwealth, the good society? 
Quite to the contrary, conservatism has more often supported the 
notion of a "mixed constitution," wherein majoritarianism would 
be checked, refracted and mediated, in part by individuals and insti-
tutions claiming special, even elite status deriving from a claim of 
possessing uncommon civic virtue, learning or freedom to espouse 
the longer view of the polity's needs and interests; in short, elite 
corps today most closely resembled by Supreme Court Justices. 
There is some irony in the fact that, as the controversy over the 
Bork nomination demonstrated three years ago, today it is largely 
II. E. BURKE, "Notes on French Affairs," supra note 3, at 430. 
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the American left that is eager to elevate judges, at least those pos-
sessed of a "correct" judicial philosophy, to the exalted status of 
Platonic guardians, whereas it is the American right that would 
deny this to them in the name of affording the widest latitude to 
popular opinion. The irony is compounded by the additional fact 
that the American left's definition of correct judicial philosophy has 
appropriated major strains of a "natural law" tradition associated 
historically with conservatism, in particular the approval by that 
tradition of judges deriving rights from moral philosophy, in addi-
tion to such more conventional sources of judicial authority as text 
and historical intent. 
Judicial conservatives in this country are thus faced with some-
thing of an intellectual dilemma. Bork's populist jurisprudence pro-
vides, despite the defeat of his nomination, a rhetorically effective 
means of criticizing prevailing liberal judicial activism in a manner 
that will often evoke genuine resonances in a politically significant 
number of Americans instinctively hostile to fundamental social 
changes that are being effectuated by judicial decrees. The difficulty 
with this approach, however, is that, apart from the jurisprudential 
shortcomings of any thoroughgoing originalist theory of constitu-
tional interpretation (and originalism forfeits much of its intellec-
tual rigor and coherence unless it is thoroughgoing), it does not 
really comport notably well with the grander and more venerable 
traditions of Western conservatism under the banner of which it has 
been deployed in this country. 
Nagel might well account himself as much an originalist or in-
terpretivist as Bork, although his admiration for Usery suggests that 
he would not bet all his chips on that methodology. Throughout 
these essays, in any event, he is not centrally concerned to debate 
competing theories of constitutional interpretation, and touches 
upon the subject only occasionally and rather peremptorally. 
Rather, his argument is that the United States suffers from a surfeit 
of constitutional interpretation threatening to overwhelm what he 
regards as the sounder and more durable constitutionalism prac-
ticed by the political branches. The various points he makes with 
such eloquence and subtlety do not, and are not intended, to 
provide a programmatic or monistic scheme for conservative activ-
ists to employ in combating what Nagel sees as excessive reliance 
upon legal interpretation in the preservation of our constitutional 
heritage. 
Nagel's is more European, in particular British, than most of 
what has recently passed for conservatism in this country, at least 
as applied to judicial review. His is a species of conservatism more 
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profound, spiritual, even delicate, and considerably less "instrumen-
tal" than any that has flourished in twentieth-century America, ex-
cept perhaps as expressed in such regional and ephemeral 
phenomena as Southern Agrarianism, a circumstance suggesting 
that European-style conservatism has latterly here been trans-
formed from a viable political platform into a matter of primarily 
literary or aesthetic sensibility. Indeed, much of what really offends 
Nagel about contemporary judicial review is its ponderous sterility, 
its tendency to labor over trivial issues, its insistence on quibbling 
over distinctions not amounting to meaningful differences, the infre-
quency with which it achieves compelling moral vision, and its 
tone-deafness vis-a-vis so many authentic national values, including 
those of constitutional lineage. 
In addition to the sense in which Nagel's Burkean conserva-
tism is literary, it is also communitarian. This accounts for his 
skepticism about the pronounced focus of modern judicial review 
upon declaring and enforcing individual rights. He does not doubt 
that such rights constitute one precious element of the American 
constitutional tradition. But these are rights as against the commu-
nity. Although in theory individual rights are enjoyed by all citi-
zens in common, in practice many of them are of a such a marginal 
character as to be exercised, much less cherished, only by a few. 
Another precious element of our constitutional tradition are 
rights, or more properly values, primarily structural and organiza-
tional, respecting the allocation of coercive power that Americans 
should value in common, as a community. Nagel's superb essays 
make a powerful case that these values have been seriously short-
changed by the courts, with the consequence that the nation has 
thereby been impoverished. Sadly, in a nation that has become so 
fractious and alienated from its own traditions and historical past as 
ours, it is at least questionable whether, wholly devoid of "crude 
instrumentalism" as they are, his insights will receive the sympa-
thetic attention they richly deserve. 
